August 4 - August 6, 1942.
Summary:
Hans Scholl, Willi Graf, Hubert Furtwängler, Alexander Schmorell, and Raimund Samüller receive their specific duty assignments. Hans and Willi are assigned to an infectious diseases ward at HVP Plankenhorn, while Hubert, Alex, and Raimund go to another section of the HVP. Hans and Alex protest - to no avail - to their Chief Medical Officer.
Important if you wish to understand the military-medical service these five young men rendered on the Russian front:
Medical services of the German army had a fairly rigid structure, similar to that of other Western military with minor differences. Medical non-coms (and Sergeant Hans Scholl and Sergeant Alexander Schmorell would have qualified) rendered first aid directly on the front lines in foxholes known as Verwundetennest. Wounds were hastily dressed, tourniquets applied, blood flow stanched. Wounded were evacuated from the Verwundetennest to the Truppenverbandplatz (TVP). Those who could walk were expected to get there under their own power. Everyone else was picked up by TVP medical personnel, although sometimes if battle raged, the wounded were simply moved slightly to the rear.
The TVP was always located as close to the front lines as possible, although allegedly out of the direct line of fire. Doctors and medics administered pain medication, tetanus shots, and shock therapy. They performed pressing procedures, such as tracheotomies. Primarily, they prepared the wounded for further transport to the Hauptverbandplatz or HVP, which supposedly was four to six miles behind the front lines.
Every HVP hypothetically had two surgeons on duty, though there could be as many as six or eight staff surgeons for an HVP near a particularly active front – which meant that less active HVPs would lend their doctors to another HVP, leaving them with one surgeon (or none) on duty. HVPs were designed to handle approximately two hundred patients, but often they crammed three or four hundred into a single facility.
An HVP was equipped with full surgical facilities, including anesthesia. In addition to admissions, apothecary, triage, and operating room, the building (only a few were tents) would have wards for the slightly wounded, badly wounded, and hopeless cases, plus – as at HVP Plankenhorn – infectious diseases if required.
Unless the HVP was extremely busy (as it would be on days when fighting was heavy and the TVP was overloaded), the medical staff took care of simple surgeries, amputations, and primary surgery on “non-transportable cases.” They did not, however, try to tackle major compound fractures or wounds to the brains, chest, or buttocks.
“Real” medical treatment took place at the Feldlazarett or field hospital, located twelve to fifteen miles behind the front lines. Specialized surgeons, x-ray facilities, dental services, and a well-stocked apothecary were elements of a field hospital missing from the HVP. The pace was still hurried, but it would be closer to the experience of working in a German, domestic military hospital, such as the one in Ebersbach where Traute Lafrenz served her clinical rotation. The doctors in a field hospital practiced actual medicine, not patch-up-and-move-out as in a TVP or HVP.
While the discontent of the soldier students may have stemmed from discomfort at being that close to the front lines, it is just as likely that they preferred a true clinical rotation that would give them medical experience they could use after the war. The things they would “learn” in an HVP would have been subjects covered in the preliminary first aid course required to qualify as a medic, not topics from their medical studies.
The five soldier students are bored, as there is little to do in their HVP. They appreciate the relative safety of their location, as Russian artillery pounds nearby Gzhatsk. They do not know it, but their position is a square on the chess board that is the Russian front. Hitler fakes documents to make it appear that Moscow is still his primary objective, while he is moving German troops to the Caucasus and Stalingrad. British intelligence warns the Red Army, who does not believe them. Instead, the Red Army works to annihilate Gzhatsk, Vyaz’ma, and Ržev.
Meanwhile, the Soviets indeed plan a counter-offensive near Stalingrad. A German intelligence officer warns Berlin of the buildup near Stalingrad, but top brass ignores him.
Still, the five soldier students are stationed on a tiny plot of soil where much fighting is taking place, and will soon intensify. They do not know about the military strategy. They just know they are no longer as safe as they had initially believed.
Willi Graf moves to a bunker closer to the HVP’s kitchen. Better accessibility to food, but his new “home” is damp and stuffy.
Why this matters:
The effectiveness of strategy - whether military, political, or business - can often depend on the reliability of those giving advice. Both the Red Army and Hitler’s army suffered because top brass listened to the “wrong” people.
White Rose History, Volume II, pages 153-155.
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